NSW Police Policy

Review date: 1 July 2021 (not yet reviewed)

Code of practice for the NSW Police Force response to Domestic and Family Violence 2018

 Code of Practice - Domestic and Family Violence Booklet 

Police employees who are VICTIMS or OFFENDERS 

The investigation

Police must treat these incidents as they would when investigating any domestic and family violence incident and make appropriate decisions about what action is required. However, because of their employment there are a number of additional issues that must be addressed which mainly concern access to firearms and complaint procedures.

When a police officer is an offender in a domestic and family violence incident police are required to refer to their internal Domestic and Family Violence Standard Operating Procedures. Initiation of proceedings for an ADVO against a police officer constitutes a complaint under the Police Act 1990 and the matter must be brought before the PACs/Police District Complaint Management Team.

An investigation provides an opportunity to monitor the outcome of the ADVO proceedings and to ensure that sufficient information is gathered to determine of any interim and/or ongoing management action that may be required.

The complaint file should include the following specific information for domestic violence complaints:

• The allegations supporting an ADVO application against a serving police officer, consistent with the

victim’s statement

• Any interim management action taken

• The final court outcome in relation to the ADVO application

Access to firearms by police officers subject to an ADVO

Where one or both parties to a DV complaint/offence or an ADVO application is/are a NSW Police Force officer/s, the same firearms restrictions apply under the Firearms Act 1996 and powers under LEPRA regarding any licensed firearms. The officer’s Commander is to be informed as soon as possible. Whether a police officer is a defendant or a protected person the officer’s NSWPF firearm should be immediately secured to prevent the officer from accessing it.

The investigating officer will make inquiries as to whether the officer is the holder of a firearms licence.

They will ensure procedures are followed for the suspension of any firearms licences and seizure of any 78

*Please note that NSW sees that police victims and police offenders are placed under the same category. Where Americas policy separates the two.

Victorian Police

 CODE OF PRACTICE  FOR THE INVESTIGATION  OF FAMILY VIOLENCE  Edition 4 ∴ Version 2  2021 page 25

 Code-of-practice-for-the-investigation-of-family-violence-Edition-4-Version-2.pdf 

 2.4   Family violence involving Victoria Police employees  

Victoria Police regards family violence involving Victoria Police employees as extremely serious and will provide  a response to family violence involving employees consistent with that provided to the community.   When family violence involves Victoria Police employees, Victoria Police responds both as an employer and as  a law enforcement agency. To address these additional complexities and obligations, Victoria Police has  developed the VPM Family violence involving Victoria Police employees. This policy provides specific guidance  for responding to family violence involving Victoria Police employees to clearly set out requirements and  responsibilities, provide oversight and manage conflicts of interest, while encouraging reporting to ensure  safety, support and accountability.   

When a Victoria Police employee is identified as a perpetrator, policy states that police officers must respond  as per the Family Violence Response Model. This includes: investigating the circumstances, conducting a risk assessment, prioritising the safety of any adult or child victims, taking appropriate civil actions, investigating  any criminal offences and holding the perpetrator to account.   Victoria Police responds to all reports of family violence perpetrated by employees. When a Victoria Police  employee is identified as a perpetrator of family violence, the report must be treated as a complaint against  police. This will result in a notification to Professional Standards Command.   In addition to civil intervention and criminal investigation, police employees who perpetrate family violence  will be subject to disciplinary action, welfare intervention and/or supervisory oversight. Disciplinary action will  take into account past disciplinary, misconduct or management interventions. Consideration will be given to  suitability for duties and employment.   Responding to police employees who are victims of family violence will take a supportive approach,  maintaining confidentiality as far as practicable, and ensuring employees can feel safe and engaged in their  workplace.  Further information can be located in the Options Guide for Victim Survivors of Victoria Police Perpetrated  Family Violence or Sexual Offences.  

Deptartment of Communities and Justice

 Safer Pathway FAQs  Service Providers (Domestic Violence)

 3.6 What if the offender is a NSW Police officer?  Police offenders are treated the same as other offenders and police officers will apply  NSWPF standard operating procedures for dealing with police officers who are  involved in domestic violence incidents.  

 Safer_Pathway_FAQS_Service_Providers.pdf 

International Association of Chiefs of Police - Domestic Violence

Law Enforcement Policy Centre

OIDV in America and how they have addressed the issue

Page 13

https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Domestic%20Violence%20FULL%20-%2006292020.pdf

 III.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT   

The law enforcement profession is not immune from having members commit domestic violence against their  intimate partners or family or household members. All officers should receive comprehensive mandatory instruction  covering the following topics related to response to domestic violence incidents involving law enforcement officers:  

• Orientation to agency policy  

• Responsibilities of supervisors and officers  

• Command notification and reporting procedures  

• Cross-jurisdictional policies and protocol  

• Officer safety  

• Confidentiality issues  

A. Agency Responsibilities  

 An intimate partner or family member of an officer may recognize early indicators of an officer’s potential for  violence, such as issues of power and control. It is critical that supervisors and fellow officers be cognizant of and  document any pattern of abusive behavior potentially indicative of domestic violence. These behaviors include, but are  not limited to,  

• monitoring and controlling behavior toward any intimate partner or family member;  

• stalking any intimate partner or family member; and  

• discrediting or disparaging an intimate partner or family member.  

Victims may communicate their concerns informally at first, such as contacting the officer’s supervisor. Informal  contacts must be treated carefully, since this is a critical opportunity for an agency to provide referrals and/or intervene  using early intervention or prevention strategies.  

Agencies should provide officers and their families with nonpunitive avenues of support and assistance before an  incident of domestic violence is reported, to include an employee assistance program; internal professional counseling,  such as that provided by a law enforcement psychologist; external professional counseling through contract or referral; advocacy support from local agencies; and peer support programs with clear reporting and confidentiality guidelines. However, a disclosure that an officer has engaged in domestic violence on the part of any officer, intimate partner, or  family member to any member of the agency should be treated as an admission or report of a crime and be investigated  both administratively and criminally.  

Officers should be required to report to their supervisor if they become the subject of a criminal investigation or  protective order proceeding. However, agencies should not rely solely on self-reporting. It is recommended that a  mechanism be established, such as annual and periodic checks of protective order databases for names of officers.  

As a matter of safety, it is essential that, to the degree possible, confidentiality be extended to any intimate partner or  family member who contacts the agency. Agencies should establish procedures for making confidential referrals to  internal or external counseling services with expertise in domestic violence. These referrals can be made upon the request  of an officer or family members, or by a supervisor through the chief executive or their designee in response to observed  warning signs.  

Agencies must be alert for officers who interfere with domestic violence cases brought against fellow officers by  stalking, intimidating, harassing, or putting under surveillance victims, witnesses, and/or family members of victims or  witnesses. If this occurs, the agency should investigate those officers and take disciplinary action, filing criminal charges  as warranted.  

B. Supervisor Responsibilities  

It is critical that supervisors receive specific training on indicators of violent and controlling behaviors and strategies  for effective management of these behaviors. This training should address agency legal considerations, criminal and civil  liability, and media and public relations, as well as criminal versus administrative investigations.  

An officer may reveal a pattern of abusive behavior potentially indicative of domestic violence while on the job; the  supervisor is in the unique position to detect these warning signs. As a supervisor becomes aware of an officer exhibiting  these behaviors, the information should be documented and the chief executive or their designee should be notified in  accordance with the agency’s chain of command. After making proper notification, the supervisor should inform the  officer that the behaviors have been documented and must cease immediately.  

C. Post-Hire Intervention  

Agencies must clearly explain the zero-tolerance policy regarding domestic violence to all officers and regularly  create opportunities to independently share this information with their families. The purpose of providing this  information to families is to underscore the agency’s zero-tolerance stance and to provide victims with avenues to  address potentially problematic behavior or report acts of domestic violence. It must be noted that in families where  there is a controlling partner it will be more difficult to provide family members with this information. This  underscores the need to develop an ongoing, multifaceted outreach campaign. Such a campaign can help ensure that  an agency communicates this information to new intimate partners and families throughout an officer’s career. In  addition, officers should be provided with information about positive strategies for managing job-related stress.  

D. Responding to a Domestic Violence Call Involving a Law Enforcement Officer  

Communications Personnel. When a call or report of domestic violence involves a law enforcement officer,  communications personnel should be directed to immediately notify and dispatch a supervisor. This ensures that  command personnel receive the information and prevents the call from being handled informally.  

Initial Patrol Response. When a member of any law enforcement agency is involved, the dynamics between the  responding officer and the agency member, such as collegiality or rank differential, have the potential for making on scene decisions difficult. When an officer is the victim, responding officers should follow standard procedure  regarding victims  of crime. When the officer is the perpetrator and if not already done so by communications  personnel, the responding officer should immediately request that an on-duty supervisor who is of higher rank than the  perpetrator report to the scene, regardless of the perpetrator’s jurisdiction. If there is no one of higher rank on duty, the  shift commander should be notified.  

On-Scene Supervisor Response. A supervisor should respond to all domestic violence calls involving a law  enforcement officer, prominent community member, or public official, regardless of the subjects’ jurisdiction, and  assume responsibility for all on-scene decision-making, including notifying the chief executive or their designee in  the accused officer’s jurisdiction.  

Additional Notifications. Agency policy should also address the possibility that the accused officer is the chief  executive. In such a situation, notification should be made to the appropriate prosecutorial entity and the individual  with direct oversight over the accused individual.  

Weapon Removal. When an arrest is made, the on-scene supervisor should relieve the accused officer of all  service weapons. Where multiple firearms are present, to include recreational firearms that the officer keeps at home,  removing only the service weapons may leave the victim vulnerable to further violence. The on-scene supervisor may  suggest that the accused officer voluntarily relinquish all firearms. The supervisor can also ask the victim about the  removal of firearms from the home for safekeeping by the agency. In situations where an arrest is not made, the on scene supervisor may consider removing the accused officer’s firearm(s) as a safety consideration and to reduce  agency liability, in accordance with applicable law.  

Agency policy should address how long removed firearms will or can be held. Where court orders of protection  are in place, these orders may affect decisions on the return or seizure of firearms. Victims should be notified prior to  the return of firearms.  

United States Law and Weapon Removal. U.S. federal law prohibits any person subject to a qualifying order of  protection from possessing firearms and ammunition.25 For agencies based in the United States, under the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) interpretation of the Gun Control Act’s Official Use Exception,  this provision does not apply to persons “performing official duties on behalf of a Federal, State or local law  enforcement agency.” This exception applies “as long as the officer is authorized or required to receive or possess that  firearm in his/her official duties.” ATF has clarified that “the authorization must be by statute, regulation, or official  department policy” and applies to both agency-issued firearms and those purchased by the officer if authorized or  required by the agency. An agency may want to limit the scope of the exception to apply only to the primary service  weapon instead of the full range of firearms with which the officer has qualified in order to further minimize liability.  An agency may choose to be more restrictive than federal law by prohibiting officers from possessing service  weapons when subject to protective orders or under criminal and/or administrative investigations.  

However, where there is a criminal conviction for a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence  (MCDV), a 1996 federal law prohibits any person from possessing firearms and ammunition.26 Unlike the provision  for court orders of protection described above, there are no “official use” exceptions allowed under this law, and it is  retroactive to convictions prior to 1996.27 As such, officers are not permitted to carry a service weapon nor are they able to possess personal firearms. Responding officers should follow agency policy and applicable law to seize all  firearms in these cases.  

E. Special Considerations  

Agencies may be faced with a domestic violence incident where the victim is a law enforcement officer or both victim and offender are law enforcement officers. If this occurs, standard domestic violence response and  investigative procedures should be followed. Safety of the victim should be the paramount concern. The agency  should take steps to protect the privacy of the officer who has been abused. Where the officer is the victim, the  reported incident should not impact negatively upon the officer’s assignments and evaluation. 

In the event that an order of protection has been issued, careful decisions must be made concerning work  assignments for accused officers pending administrative and criminal investigations. Firearm removal in this situation  becomes additionally complex. In the development of the policy, individual agencies should seek legal guidance to  protect the rights of all concerned.  

F. Agency Follow-up  

Debriefing. Agencies should consider conducting a debriefing of the incident for all involved agency personnel,  including responding officers and communications personnel. This debriefing can be used as an opportunity to review  the agency’s confidentiality guidelines and may include a direct order prohibiting discussion of the incident outside of  the official inquiry.  

Designated Principal Contact. Promptly following the report of the incident, the agency should assign a member of  the command staff as the victim’s principal contact for case information. This connection is essential for addressing  safety and informing victims about all aspects of agency protocols and policies, to include confidentiality policies and  their limitations, and applicable laws. As a matter of safety, the victim’s whereabouts and any communication with  victims must be kept confidential.  

G. Victim Safety  

As the consequences of being held responsible for their behavior, such as the potential loss of employment coupled  with the loss of control over the intimate partner, become apparent, an abusive officer may escalate behavior. The  victim’s principal contact should offer the victim the opportunity to create a safety plan and discuss stalking. Information  learned through the risk assessment should be incorporated into the development of a safety plan created by the victim  and principal contact together or with the assistance of an experienced domestic violence victim advocate.  

H. Administrative Investigations and Decisions  

A comprehensive administrative investigation of the accused officer should be conducted, and steps should be  taken to reduce the potential for further violence by seizing firearms and using administrative orders of protection.  

Termination Procedures. U.S. federal law prohibits anyone convicted of an MCDV from possessing firearms or ammunition. Therefore, individuals convicted of these crimes can no longer serve as law enforcement officers.  Officers in these situations should either be terminated or demoted to a non-sworn position. The agency should seize  all agency-owned firearms, as well as those possessed by the convicted officer as allowable under applicable law.  Any officer determined through an administrative investigation or convicted through criminal proceedings of  domestic violence to have committed domestic violence should be disciplined up to or including termination.  Once the administrative and/or criminal investigations conclude with the decision to terminate or demote an  officer, the chief executive or their designee is responsible for notifying the officer in person and in writing. Due to  the heightened risk for violence at the point of termination, the chief executive or their designee should ensure that the victim is notified in a timely manner and offered available assistance, to include safety planning. However, this  notification may be subject to restrictions on information release per collective bargaining agreements.  

IV.  AGENCY TRAINING  

All agency personnel, both sworn and non-sworn, should receive comprehensive mandatory instruction upon  implementation of a domestic violence policy and on a continuing and annual basis. Training should include, but not  be limited to, the following:  

• Dynamics of domestic violence including physical, emotional, and sexual violence  

• Understanding victims and perpetrators of domestic violence  

• Understanding trauma and reaction to violence  

• Understanding the effects of domestic violence on children  

• Assessing risk and lethality  

• Utilizing investigation techniques  

• Identifying stalking behaviors  

• Assessing for strangulation  

• Understanding firearm laws and procedures  

• Enforcing protection orders and enforcement  

• Accessing community resources and referrals  

• Properly completing the domestic violence supplemental report form  

• Understanding domestic violence in the workplace  

• Special considerations for officer-involved domestic violence, both when the officer is the victim and  the perpetrator  

Additional supplemental training should include bulletins, roll-call information, verbal reminders, supervisory mentoring,  and patrol briefings. Agency executives should ensure the review of training annually and make any revisions deemed  necessary. 

 APPENDIX A: 

PREDOMINANT AGGRESSOR DETERMINATION  

When determining the predominant aggressor, officers should consider the following questions:  

• Who uses threats and intimidation in the relationship?  

• Does either individual in the relationship isolate their partner?  

• Who is emotionally abusive (uses degrading names, humiliating comments, etc.)?  

• How are minimization, blame, and denial being used by the victim or the suspect or both?  

• Who utilizes the children to get their way in the relationship?  

• Who has forced sexual contact or used sexual acts as a way to control the other?  

• Who has control of the money and finances or uses them as a way to control the other?  

• Who utilizes coercion and threats?  

• Have any threats been carried out or have steps been taken to carry them out?  

• Does either party have a history of committing violent crimes?  

• Is there a history of domestic violence between the parties?  

• Is there a physical size difference between the parties?  

• Does either party have a protection order against them or a history of protection orders against them?  

• Who appears to be more capable of assaulting the other?  

• What is the severity of the injuries to the parties?  

• Did either party utilize self-defense?  

• Is there potential for violence in the future? If so, by whom?  

• Which party has access to firearms or other weapons?  

• What types of injuries do the parties have? Are they offensive or defensive in nature?  

• Does either party express fear of the other?  

• Is there evidence from witnesses?  

 POLICE MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONSTASMANIA page 76 

Guide to managing misconduct in the Tasmanian public sector   

The respondent may leave before the  investigation has started. For instance, this may  happen when they are suspended or notified of  the impending investigation.  In this case it will probably not be in the public  interest to invest resources into pursuing the  matter. However, you should take steps to protect  your organisation in the event the respondent  reapplies for employment. This means that you  should – depending on the potential seriousness of  the matter – inform the respondent in writing that:  • you will place on their personnel file a  declaration about the matter, noting that they  left before it was resolved [FS7], and  • if they successfully reapply for employment, the  matter may be pursued.  If the matter is potentially relevant to the work  of an external body – such as the police or a  professional regulatory body – it should still be  reported to that body. 

Report 2019-2021

Page 12

Case Review 4131  

This case involved the murder of Sue, aged in her 50s, by her estranged husband, Craig, aged in his 60s, on a  camping trip in regional Victoria. Craig suicided a few days later.  

Sue was described by her friends as a vibrant person who was always helping others. She was caring and  generous to her three children and ten grandchildren.  

Craig used coercive control against Sue throughout their 30+year marriage and his abuse continued after the  relationship had ended. Early on in the relationship he perpetrated severe physical violence against Sue including  non-fatal strangulation, sexual abuse and inflicted physical injuries that required reconstructive surgery. After two  decades, the severity and frequency of Craig’s physical violence decreased, while his non-physical abuse tactics escalated. 

Craig subjected Sue to a wide-range of psychological abuse and gaslighting; financial abuse; social  abuse; technology-facilitated stalking; spiritual abuse; and systems abuse. He threatened to kill her and other  family members including their own children.  Despite this calculated and comprehensive suite of both physical and non-physical abuse tactics, Sue was  resilient and strategic in her resistance. She managed to keep her elderly and vulnerable mother safe while living  with Craig and maintained a close and supportive network of friends. She kept diaries as a tangible record of her  version of events to counter the constant confusion and false reality created by Craig’s psychological abuse and gaslighting. Later in life, Sue began studying counselling to gain insight into her own experiences of violence and  Craig’s abusive behaviour.  Over the years Sue made several attempts to leave the relationship and sought protection via ADVOs, however  Craig’s knowledge of the criminal justice system (as an ex-police officer) thwarted these attempts. Craig made  counter allegations to police against Sue and in doing so was able to manipulate her into withdrawing ADVO  applications. Ultimately Sue disengaged with the legal system. She began to seek help and support via other means and disclosed her experiences of violence to her family, friends, church community and GP.  Two months prior to the homicide Sue’s GP contacted police after she disclosed an episode of non-fatal  strangulation. Police applied for an ADVO protecting Sue and charged Craig with intimidation and assault  offences however he denied the offending behaviour and the charges were withdrawn. In a clear demonstration  of systems abuse, Craig applied for a cross-ADVO against Sue. Final orders were made (by agreement)  protecting Sue from Craig, and Craig from Sue - despite there being no evidence that she had ever been abusive  towards Craig.  Following this police engagement Sue was referred to a specialist domestic violence service provider (through  the Women’s Domestic Violence Court Advocacy Service) who assessed her as ‘at serious threat’ and referred  her to a Safety Action Meeting. However, Sue’s threat level was downgraded prior to the meeting because  she was engaged with services, an ADVO was in place for Sue and Craig was thought to be living in a town  hundreds of kilometres away.  During this period Sue was also referred to a Domestic Violence Duty Solicitor and received legal advice  regarding property settlement (as well as the cross-ADVO). It appears that the solicitor may have advised Sue  to immediately recover her possessions from their jointly owned property where Craig was living. Sue asked her  friends and family members to recover the property on her behalf however they were reluctant to assist because  they were afraid of Craig.  Over the next six weeks Craig breached the non-contact provisions of the ADVO many times while attempting to  coerce Sue into reuniting with him. He constantly texted, called and emailed her to coax her into travelling to see  him at their jointly owned property. She also wanted to recover her belongings before he destroyed them - as he had in the past with many of her other precious possessions. Sue eventually agreed to travel to the property  but did not tell her friends or family where she was going because she felt a sense of shame and guilt for visiting  Craig. Sue was killed by Craig during this trip.  Before she was killed, Sue disclosed to a number of friends and service providers that Craig had threatened  to murder her and said he would make it look like suicide. It is suspected that Craig strangled Sue during the  camping trip and buried her somewhere in the surrounding bushland. It is thought that Craig initially intended on misleading police, but upon his realisation that the murder would be discovered, died by suicide. Sue’s body has  never been found. 

 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Death Review Report 2021_FINAL.pdf 

 When you "pay people" to give an evaluation this is the results below

Safer Pathway Evaluation | ARTD  We conducted an independent evaluation to assess if the initiative was implemented as intended and meeting its objectives, and to identify opportunities for improvement. Our evaluation of Safer Pathway found the program is delivering a consistent, effective and timely response to victims across NSW. As a result of Safer Pathway:

• victim’s safety is being routinely assessed by NSW Police and victims at serious threat is being prioritised throughout the Safer Pathway service response
• a single, streamlined referral pathway has replaced the previous service fragmentation and duplication, helping victims to access the support they need and facilitating information sharing between service providers to prevent threats to a person’s life, health or safety
• there is now a standard level of service for victims across NSW, with victims at high risk now receiving a more consistent, coordinated response across NSW and across service providers.

We also identified 23 recommendations to improve the service model and delivery. These related to:

• expanding referral pathways from other agencies and services
• continuing to provide and strengthen state-wide training
• revising the current DVSAT to enhance its predictive ability
• investigating strategies to engage hard-to-reach groups and address service gaps
• developing and implementing more systematic data collection for monitoring and evaluation.

Women NSW and partner agencies are using the evidence and recommendations in the report strengthening the service response to victims of DFV in NSW, documented in their response to the report. 

Reports and Recommendations

March 2016

Alan Corbett 

Royal Commision in 2016 

Family violence involving police  

The Code of Practice stresses that the police response to a family violence incident in which a police member  is either the victim or the perpetrator of family violence should be of the same standard as that afforded any  other incident: a thorough investigation is undertaken, civil and criminal options are pursued as appropriate,  and the primary aggressor is identified. The Code also requires that a supervisor be notified and must attend  the incident. If a criminal offence has occurred, including a breach of an FVIO, the Victoria Police Professional  Standards Command must be notified. There are further reporting requirements in the Victoria Police Manual  for employees serving an FVIO on another employee and for an employee being served with an FVIO.  

The terms of reference for the VEOHRC inquiry explicitly excluded consideration of the prevalence of family  violence where Victoria Police personnel are alleged perpetrators.264 The VEOHRC report did, however,  draw a link between poor attitudes in Victoria Police and the interaction between police members and the community:  The need to ensure a gender balance that reflects the community it services is crucial,  particularly for building safety and trust in the organisation by women who need the help of  Victoria Police to feel confident they will be believed and treated with respect. To maintain  and continue to build community confidence, Victoria Police will need to model safety and  respect among all its employees.

 The report also noted that police work can be conducive to the forming of relationships between co-workers, and that culturally Victoria Police is like a family to its members, one female interviewee stating:  

"You can’t address family violence in the community unless you address family violence in the force. Violence against women in the force is a form of family violence because  Victoria Police is ‘home’ for so many people. It’s our blue family. But it’s not called out …"

This Royal Commission was able to locate little published research or statistical information on family  violence committed by police members in Australia. Mr Alan Corbett, who presented a submission, directed  the Commission to an article he authored containing statistical information obtained from Victoria Police  under freedom of information laws:  Data, extracted from VicPol’s Register of Complaints and Serious Incidents  Database (ROCSID), revealed that in the calendar years 2011–2014, a total of 190  Victorian police of various ranks were respondents to a court issued Family Violence  Intervention Order …  However, these statistics are very likely to be a gross underestimate of the actual  incidence of PODA [police officer domestic abuse]. Limited research on the prevalence of family violence committed by police has been undertaken in the United  States. Some studies suggest that the rate of domestic violence in law enforcement families is much higher  than in the general population. More recent research notes that, while two small studies from the early  1990s point to higher rates of domestic violence in law enforcement families, no large population-based  studies have been conducted since that time. The authors went on to quote the US National Institute of Justice, which has stated that police domestic violence is ‘an almost entirely unstudied phenomenon’.

Despite the lack of data, Mr Corbett’s submission raises concerns about the prevalence of family violence  committed by police members, the barriers facing victims, and the lack of adequate acknowledgment of and  response to this issue by Victoria Police and political leaders.271 Among other things, Mr Corbett’s submission  asserts the following:  

Victims of family violence perpetrated by police members can be distinguished from other victims  because they must seek help from the organisation the perpetrator belongs to, creating additional barriers  to reporting.  

Police culture can prevent members from speaking out and taking action against colleagues who commit  family violence.  

Family violence perpetrated by police members undermines public trust and thus undermines all police   in preventing and responding to family violence.  

Victoria Police should, in conjunction with other Australian police services, formulate a comprehensive,  transparent, stand-alone policy on family violence perpetrated by police members and should publish  existing policies and statistics online.

Mr Corbett’s submission referred to model policies published by the International Association of Chiefs  of Police (2003) in the United States and the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and  Northern Ireland (2004, 2008), while noting that the former has had scant take-up, and the latter became  outdated as a result of regulatory change. 

Table 14.3 summarises the main components of the International Association of Chiefs of Police model.  

 Royal Commission into Family Violence: Report and Recommendations Volume 3 

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE  Public Hearing 25 November 2024 

Integrity and Oversight Committee’s review of the  performance of Victorian integrity agencies in 2022/23  

 2.-imcl-response-to-questions-on-notice-20241224.pdf 

 For victim-survivors of police members in rural and remote areas, this will often result in  disclosures being made to an officer whom the victim knows, and who is a colleague of the  perpetrator or knows him. This can increase the known reticence of many high-risk victims of  police-perpetrators in their first family-violence related interaction with police, on account of  victim-survivor concerns about member conflict of interest, and confidentiality and trust  concerns (in dealing with the immediate colleagues of their perpetrator). This is problematic, as  SOFVU is reliant upon these first recorded utterances/reports to triage cases and decide  whether to regionally delegate them or not. Consequently, SOFVU often triages cases and  assesses risk based upon inaccurate information.      

Local/divisional members have an insurmountable conflict of interest (whether actual or  perceived) when managing or investigating DFV matters involving a colleague they know or are  connected to. The survivor network can provide a slew of examples provided by survivors of local members discouraging victim-survivors from reporting, including but not limited to police members -  

a) stressing employment consequences and mental health adverse impacts for the  perpetrator and the consequent adverse impacts for the victim-survivor and her children;  

b) seemingly weaponising child protection (telling victim-survivors that if family violence  disclosures are made, reports will need to be made to child protection and that the  victim-survivor may be assessed as “not a protective parent”);   

c) authoratively telling other members not to believe the victim-survivor and accusing her of  being the protagonist (this is often followed by police-colleagues supporting the accused  member in court appearances);   

d) minimising offending and victim blaming, or refusing to take a report of family violence  against a member or to action a breach of an FVIO;   

e) recording that no offending has been disclosed in written notes when audio recordings  made by survivors show offending was disclosed; and   

f)  informing the alleged perpetrator what the victim-survivor has asked or disclosed as a  “heads up mate”. 

The particular tactics used by police officers in both perpetrating family violence and  procuring breaches of confidentiality to obtain information about their victims  Police perpetrators are not the same as other family violence perpetrators. Police perpetrator  can and do exploit their systemic knowledge of police and court processes to evade  accountability, engage in family violence in ways that are heard to prove in court, control the  narrative with investigators, and get in first with allegations or make cross allegations (thereby  increasing victim-survivor mis-identification risk). For example, police perpetrators have been  reported by victim-survivors to:  

a) Stalk and intimidate victim-survivors using both police equipment/systems and  information gained through social engineering tactics with their police colleagues  (confidentiality breaches). Victim-survivors have reported perpetrators abusing LEAP;  soliciting information about a victim-survivor and her complaint from other members;  plate-checking the cars of people associated with victim-survivors (or getting their  colleagues to do the same for them), getting colleagues to do “drive bys” and welfare  checks (often after engaging in “DARVO” [Deny, Attack, Reverse Victim and Offender]  tactics with their immediate colleagues regarding victim-survivors, similar to the tactics  described immediately below). 

 b) Engage in harassment using other police members (and in the case of police-member victim-survivors encouraging others to make complaints against the police-member victim-survivor). Such harassment can also involve convincing colleagues that the victim survivor is mentally unstable, has veracity issues, is maliciously making allegations or is  abusing the children, resulting in those colleagues conveying these sentiments to the  family violence informant/investigator.  

c) Use police information to intimidate the victim-survivor and convince her that other  police members have the same toxic attitudes about family violence and victims of crime  as the perpetrator (e.g. showing a victim-survivor images of murder/serious assault  victim photos, joking about these in a menacing way, and convincing the victim-survivor  that Victoria Police will not believe them or have empathy for them).    

d) Impersonate victim-survivors online to alienate them from others or gather information  about the victim-survivor from her unsuspecting friends; e-surveil victim-survivors and  use tracking devices & apps; and hack victim-survivors’ accounts (more so than the  average perpetrator).  

e) Posture and interrogate victim-survivors (including children) police style - to intimidate  and control.  

f)  Reset devices to destroy evidence, as police-perpetrators know what evidence police will  look for, use VPNs when engaging on online offending, and offend in ways that are hard  to track and prove because they (police perpetrators) “know the system”.  

g) Try to “set up” victim-survivors – for example by abusing the victim-survivor and then  recording her reaction, and only using the recorded reaction if she responds in an  emotional or explosive way in either –  i.  ii.  threatening to use that information to take an intervention order out against the  victim-survivor and have her identified as a primary aggressor, if she reports his  (the perpetrator’s) violence, or  “getting in first” - accusing the victim-survivor of being a perpetrator and seeking  an order against her before she has an opportunity to make a report to police.  

h) Make actual or implied firearms threats and emphasising how proficient the perpetrator  is with firearms. We note that unsuspended police members have access to firearms and  systems whether formal firearms licenses have been revoked or not. By way of further  explanation, unless a member is suspended with premises access cut, in practice and  using social engineering and flaws in weapons security processes, they can still access  police weapons and systems).   

i)  Send intimate photos of victim-survivors to colleagues &/ threaten to do so or to make  deep fakes (or pretending he has to make his victim-survivor less likely to report  offending to those colleagues).  

j)  Using physical abuse methods that don’t leave marks, including using chokeholds and  pressure points.   

The use of the above tactics by police perpetrators can be hard to detect to all but specialist  family violence workers (and specialist police) and hence can make high risk perpetrators and  family violence offending appear to be low risk. In our view, surfacing and dealing with such  behaviours earlier (and hence assisting victim-survivors earlier) can only be achieved if SOFVU  is funded to take and direct manage all family violence matters (both criminal complaints and  intervention order applications), with the training provided to SOFVU members maintained or  scaled up and the roles of witness support offices maintained, so as to ensure existing SOFVU  competence levels do not drop.  

 What did the Commission’s review find?  

We reviewed 470 complaints about police  responding to domestic and family violence  incidents that were made between 1 July 2017  and 1 July 2021. Police investigated 222 of  these complaints. We did a detailed review of  these matters.  

The complaints fell into 2 categories:  

1. Officers being involved in domestic and  family violence incidents.  

• 70 out of 222 complaint investigations,  comprising 60 police, related to officers  being involved in domestic and family  violence incidents.  

• 17 of these officers were charged with  offences.    

• 11 out of 60 involved officers had been  previously investigated for domestic and  family violence — in some cases more  than once.  

• most investigations into police officers  involved in domestic and family violence  incidents included poor record keeping  about the removal of their firearms.  

2. Inadequate investigations into reported  domestic and family violence incidents.  

The most concerning issues we saw were:  

• a failure to make a record of the  reported incident  

• victim statements not taken or   incomplete  

• no witness statements sought  

• inadequate supervision of the  investigation   

• no victim support provided  

• failure to collect suitable evidence  

• police did not apply for an ADVO.   

Did you know?  NSW police officers respond to nearly 500  domestic and family violence incidents every  day. The NSW Police Force estimates that  domestic and family violence accounts for up  to 40% of police work in NSW.     

Key NSW Police Force strategies to  reduce domestic and family violence  

• police-issued provisional ADVOs  

• targeted checks on high risk defendants’  compliance with ADVO conditions   

• video and audio recording evidence of  domestic and family violence victims  

• identifying the threat of future harm to  victims  

• identifying and targeting repeat  offenders.  

What did the Commission recommend?  

We made 13 recommendations to strengthen  NSW Police Force procedures and the way it  investigates complaints.   

Our recommendations included taking steps to:  

• improve processes for investigating officers  who may be involved in domestic and family  violence  

• provide adequate and mandatory training to  all officers in domestic and family violence  procedures  

• improve record keeping practices in relation  to the removal of firearms  

• make clear records every time police respond  to a domestic and family violence incident.          

What will the NSW Police Force do  now?  

The NSW Police Force is planning significant  changes to the way it manages and  investigates domestic and family violence.   

They have told us they will address a number  of our recommendations under their new  model for managing these incidents.   

The Commission will continue monitoring the  way the NSW Police Force deals with  complaints about domestic violence as we  independently ensure misconduct matters  are dealt with appropriately.